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POINT I
THE PROCEDURE OF INVESTIGATING ALL OUT OF STATE MOTORISTS
BASED UPON THE SINGLE MOVEMENT OF A VEHICLE BECAUSE OUT OF
STATE DRIVERS MAY BE IMPAIRED IS UNREASONABLE.
The State in the Brief mischaracterizes the position of
the Appellants as claiming error based upon a claim of only
pretext stop.

The Defendants submit that the car in which

they were riding was stopped even though there was never any
objective traffic violation.

1

The stop took place because of the unique investigatory
procedure of the Sheriff's Deputy conducting drug
investigations of the highway.

The Deputy stops out-of-

state vehicles on the slightest movement even between
eastbound lanes of travel.

The Appellants were stopped

before there was any reasonable probable cause of the
violation traffic regulations.
The Appellant draws attention to the attempted
justification by the State in the Statement
forth in the Appellee's Brief.

of

Facts

set

The Appellee admits that the

evidence was introduced at the hearing that "because 8 0 to
90 percent of traffic accidents on that stretch of road (the
main route between Las Angeles and Denver) are one car
accidents caused by a sleepy or intoxicated driver, [Deputy
Barney's] greatest concern is to watch for drivers that may
be sleepy or intoxicated", further "Deputy Barney sees tired
drivers in the early morning when the Appellants were
operating their vehicle".

(See Appellees brief, page 5.)

The State ignores the issue raised by this appeal as to
whether the Court is going to essentially overrule the
2

State

v.

Bello,

871 P.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1989) and find that one

slight movement is weaving or constitutes a motion, erratic
driving which is indicative of an sleepy or intoxicated
driver.

Here, the Deputy immediately pursued and stopped

the vehicle without further observation of driving pattern
based upon his generalized investigative techniques.

The

Deputy works under assumption that most drivers traveling
form out of the county with out of State plates would be
tired and this rationale allows him to stop a majority of
any vehicle on the stretch of interstate highway which he
patrols by special assignment.
In State v.

Bello,

871 P.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1994), the

facts leading to suppression of a search and seizure by the
same Deputy were as follows:
On March 15, 1991, at approximately 11:15 a.m., Deputy
Phil Barney was traveling west on 1-70 when he noticed
Bello's eastbound pickup truck temporarily drift so that it
straddled both eastbound lanes of traffic. Barney turned his
vehicle around, activated his video recorder, and pursued
the truck in order to stop it and determine whether the
driver of the vehicle was under the influence of alcohol,
drowsy, or otherwise impaired. For the approximately two
miles that Barney followed the truck, he observed no further
problems that might indicate an impaired driver, and he
stated at the hearing on the motion to suppress that there
3

were extreme wind conditions that day that might account for
the temporary drifting of the truck into the other lane....
Unlike the State's in this appeal, the State in

Bello

contended that when Bello's truck briefly crossed the center
line of the eastbound lanes and therefore the Defendant
violated a statute requiring that a vehicle be operated "as
nearly as practical entirely within a single lane."
Code

Ann.

41-6-61(1)

Utah

(1953).

This Court should also find that the initial suspicion,
which was triggered by a minor driving aberration, was not
corroborated, the Appellants did not violate Utah Code
Annotated

41-6-61

(1) by "weaving once" around the curve.

Both lanes of the roadway travel in the same direction and
the road was curving down and around a hill.

The State has

not proven an actual traffic violation and no reasonable
proof of a possible future violation before a vehicle would
be stopped by an officer conducting a traffic infestation.
Therefore, this Court should find there was no objective
basis to stop under Utah traffic laws and there was no
reason to immediately stop to check for possible tired

4

drivers.(The Defendant testier they had stayed overnight in
Beaver, Utah)
In reviewing the legality of a traffic stop, this
consider two questions: "[W]hether the officer's action was
justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place." Terry

v.

Ohio,

20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968); accord State
P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994);and, State v.

v.

3 92 U.S. 1,
Lopez,

Patefield,

873
303

Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (CA, 11/7/96). The officer never observed
any pattern of driving and after one brief observation drove
his vehicle through the median and immediately turned on his
overhead lights to effect detention.

Morever, the

Appellant's car came within a very short distance of the
patrol car parked in the middle of the road and the Deputy
was able to see the driver was alert and view him at close
range.
The Court should not abandon the analysis determining
whether or not the vehicle should be stopped and adopt an
objective, critical analysis of the stop.
5

Under such a

critical analysis, the Appellant submits that the State
failed to prove the stop not based upon objective evidence
of a violation of the Utah State Traffic Code.

POINT II
THE DEFENDANT "COMMUNITY CARETAKER" LEGAL
PRINCIPLES TO RANDOM STOPS MADE TO CHECK POSSIBLE
TIRED DRIVERS BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT
The Defendants raised in the Memorandum
Motion

To Suppress,

In Support

Of

filed with the District Court, the same

issue of whether the only logical basis to stop a vehicle
must based upon the deputies policy be as a community
caretaker stopping possibly tired drivers. (See Defendant's
Post-Hearing Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Suppress
file in January, 1996.)

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
In conclusion, the Defendant's respectfully
request that the Court reverse the denial of the Motion to
Suppress.

The Defendants vehicle should not have been

stopped and should have been allowed to drive through Sevier

County, Utah without being arbitrarily stopped for a drug
investigation without probable cause of a violation of the
Traffic Code merely because they were in an out-of-state
car.

The Appellant requests the Court enter an order

reversing the District Court's denial of the Motion to
Suppress.
DATED this

day of December, 1996.

RANDALL GAITHER
Attorney for the
Defendant-Appellants
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